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INTRODUCTION 
World economy at present tends to have the colour of 
bloc economy. This latter, however, having a natural inclina· 
tion towards independence and self·preservation, is bound 
to transform national economy into a particular exchange 
economy through the application of the liberty and laissez· 
faire doctrines which are the inherent principles of capitalism. 
Hitherto, world economy was regarded as the sum total of 
national economies having the principles of liberty, equality 
and laissez-faire, or as consisting primarily of these national 
economies; but now it is considered to consist of several 
bloc economies each of which is formed around some power-
ful national economy. 
Viewed historically, world economy has had two opposite 
tendencies. First, it tended to recognise liberty, equality 
and laissez-faire as matters of principle among national 
economies which constituted it. Secondly, it tended to reject 
the same principles. The European War may be viewed 
as an outcome of the laissez-faire policy of the nineteenth 
century and after, but the principles of restriction and un· 
equality shown by the War for European hegemony have 
had a reaction on national economies which now lay stress 
on liberty and laissez·faire. All are aware that the operation 
of national economies has met with serious difficulties, which 
fact is the outstanding characteristic of world economy at 
present. 
These two opposite tendencies or circumstances of world 
economy involve a problem of paramount importance when 
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principles of liberty, equality and laissez-faire are given 
formal recognition by nations which are engaged in the 
struggle to capture markets for their respective products, 
their full and free application in actual practice is not per-
mitted_ Nor is this unnatural in view of the differences in 
the real circumstances of the economic development of 
nations_ One may say in this connection that the League 
of Nations committed a great error when, after the European 
War, it ignored the inevitable law of the development of 
capitalism, by attempting to apply the principles of liberty, 
equality and laissez-faire to economic systems, particularly 
monetary systems, just as it did in handling the political 
problems of nations_ It was quite natural for the League 
to decide to revive the gold standard in its attempt at the 
continuation or resuscitation of the capitalist economy after 
the War; but there is no denying that in carrying out that 
decision, it made a mistake by unconditionally encouraging 
the gold exchange standard, which is a form of the gold 
standard_ For the gold exchange standard will give impetus 
to monopolistic loans when, in the course of the development 
of the capitalist economy, financial capital has become pre-
dominant_ Its characteristics do not correspond with the 
principles of liberty, equality and laissez-faire which charac-
terised the period of the predominance of industrial capital. 
Such, indeed, is the serious error which is bound up with 
the essence of the gold exchange standard as upheld by 
the League of Nations after the War. 
If there were a monetary system capable of allowing 
national economies which constitute world economy to 
practise the principles of liberty, equality and laissez·faire, 
thereby upholding these principles, the final outcome of the 
above question will not be difficult of anticipation. But so 
long as gold is admitted as the only standard of valuation, 
in the working of the capitalist economy, these principles 
represent only one phase of present-day economic phenomena 
- they only show something which is formal rather than 
substantial. It is thus necessary to re-examine the gold 
90 K. MATSUOKA 
exchange standard which is so liable to cause a blunder, in 
order to study its real validity. I am inclined to believe 
that it is a one·dimensional and mechanical view to regard 
world economy as a sum total of equal national economies 
because of the development of the organization in the capi· 
talist economy; I am impressed with the importance of 
treating world economy as a manY·dimensional and organic 
phenomenon. I shall adopt this basic viewpoint in examining 
the advisability of adopting the gold exchange standard. I 
am convinced that this interpretation of world economy is 
forcing changes in the traditional views and ideas of national 
economy and of the gold exchange standard itself. 
Viewed thus, the outstanding fact of the existing gold 
exchange standard is that the leading country to adopt a 
bloc economy is controlling its member countries as markets 
for its own products. 
It is imperative for Japan to study this problem in order 
to solve various problems of importance which are at her 
very threshold - I mean the Japan·Manchoukuo economic 
bloc, in connection with the gold exchange standard. Japan 
has operated the gold exchange standard between the close 
of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth. 
There are many questions that may be asked in connection 
with this matter. We may ask the following: What are 
the relations between the traits of Japanese economy and 
this gold exchange standard? What is its content as en· 
forced in Chosen? What effects has the enforcement of the 
system in Chosen and Manchoukuo had on Japan's pro-
ductivity? How did the system extend its influence to 
Manchoukuo after the latter's establishment? What relations 
will the system bear to Manchoukuo, China and Siberia in 
the future? To these questions answers must be given by 
those who are interested in the Japan-Manchoukuo economic 
bloc. However, I cannot take up all of these questions in 
this paper. I shall only deal here with the circumstances 
which attended Japan's adoption of the gold exchange system 
and leave the discussion of other matters to some future 
~-~----------~ 
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occasion. 
It should be noted in this connection that historical 
factors have a very important bearing on monetary systems, 
and especially on the gold standard. Without a serious 
investigation of historical factors, no thorough-going examina· 
tion of the gold exchange standard will be possible. There 
is no doubt that its historical colour corresponds with the 
content of the national economy of a nation. 
2. JAPAN'S HISTORY PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION 
OF THE GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD 
The monetary system of Modern Japan originated in the 
adoption of the silver standard in 1869. The gold standard 
was adopted in 1871. But a double standard of gold and 
silver may be said to have originated in 1878, when the 
one-yen silver coin hitherto circulated only in foreign trade 
ports was put into circulation in all parts of the land. In 
actual practice, however, we had only the silver standard 
inasmuch as silver coins only were in circulation. 
The depreciation of silver at that time was world·wide. 
It was encouraged by factors such as the sale of silver in 
Germany due to her adoption of the gold standard, the 
limitation and suspension of the free coining of silver by 
the members of the Latin Monetary Union, and above all 
by the steady increase in silver production on the American 
Continent. In 1893 British India, the greatest silver country 
in the Orient, completed its monetary refonn and adopted 
the gold exchange stanc!ard, thereby stimulating the depre· 
ciation of silver. All these events had their considerable 
effect on Japan. The value of the yen went down and the 
nation's foreign trade was placed in an absolute bog, as 
there was no reliable and fixed stanc!ard of value. Japanese 
industrialists and merchants had nothing to guide them in 
their production or their commercial transactions. AIl these 
circumstances convinced our statesmen and other leaders 
that the only solution of the national difficulties lay in the 
, 
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adoption of the gold standard which had gradually replaced 
other systems in Europe. 
Japan, which had been enforcing a system of silver 
conversion, established on September 11, 1893, the Monetary 
System Investigation Commission. The reason for its estab· 
Iishment as well as its function were explained by the 
Minister of Finance substantially as follows: . 
.. Some of the silver countries of the world are now 
making investigations into the merits and demerits of the 
different monetary systems in order to preserve their own 
economic interests; while others are already carrying out 
their monetary reforms following such investigations. . . . . 
I am in favour of creating a Monetary System InVestigation 
Commission which shall be composed of men of wide ex· 
perience and profound learning, in order to study the cause 
and effect of the fluctuation of gold and silver and its 
influence on our own economy in the past as well as its 
probable influence in the future; also to decide whether it 
is necessary to revise the monetary system now in force; 
and further to study the best means for the adoption of the 
gold standard and its enforcement, as well as other matters 
relating to it, should it be found advisable to adopt such a 
monetary system." 
It is thus clear that the main obiect of the Monetary 
System Investigation Commission was to find whether it was 
advisable_ to adopt the gold standard and, if so, to decide 
upon the kind of system and the best means for its adop· 
tion. 
The Monetary System Investigation Commission was 
composed of 22 members including a chairman and a vice· 
chairman. It appointed a sub·committee at its first meet· 
ing on January 25, 1893. This sub·committee first met on 
November 14 the same year and held altogether 37 meetings 
during the 16 months up to March 27, 1895. It reported 
its decision to the Commission on March 27 the same year. 
The Commission met five times, the last session being held 
on July 3, at which session the final decision was reached. 
---- ----------- .----
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The majority of its members favoured the adoption of the 
gold standard, while a minority dissented. The Government 
concurred with the views of the majority; they recognized 
the urgency of reforming the monetary system of the nation. 
But there remained the difficult problem of deciding on the 
means for the carrying out of such a basic monetary reform, 
since a large reserve fund was needed for the adoption and 
the successful operation of the gold standard. It was a 
problem of stupendous difficulty for Japan of that period, 
since her economy was still in its infancy. 
Fortunately, the Sino·Japanese War of 1894-5 came to 
a successful close, and Japan obtained a war indemnity of 
360 million yen. The Government decided to use this sum 
as reserves for the gold standard. At first the payment of 
the indemnity was to be made in the Chinese silver money 
(Kupei silver), but Japan succeeded in obtaining payment in 
London in pounds sterling. This was an advantage, be-
cause the value of silver was greatly depreciated and was 
subject to frequent fluctuations, and Japan knew that her 
adoption of the gold standard was a question of time only. 
Thus, the war indemnity was paid by China in the currency 
of Great Britain which was on the gold standard. Japan's 
preparations for the adoption of the gold standard were now 
rushed on. There was much criticism regarding the work 
of preparation, and this spurred on the Government to carry 
out its decision. A monetary reform bill and other related 
bills were laid before the Cabinet Council on February 25, 
1897. The bills were passed by the Imperial Diet in March 
of the same year and were given Imperial sanction, taking 
effect from Octcber 1. Thus, Japan came to have a single 
gold standard. 
The Government was entitled to use part of the war 
indemnity for effecting the monetary reform, namely, the 
adoption of a single gold standard. But the Government 
had promised the Imperial Diet not to withdraw the money 
in haste, as it was feared that the sudden transference of 
so large a sum would cause a disturbance in the London 
'~'-"~-" .. _- - .---
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market. This special circumstance under which our gold 
standard was adopted requires a more careful study than 
would have been necessary had it been adopted under more 
ordinary circumstances. 
Japan received the war indemnity in pounds sterling 
and used part of it in replacing her silver coins by gold 
coins. Now there are several points which should be studied 
from the standpoint of the gold exchange standard. The 
Indemnity Special Account is one of such points. The reci· 
procal deposit between the Government and the Bank of 
Japan is a second; and the Government's depositing part of 
the indemnity with the Bank of Japan for interest is a third. 
I shall take up each of these points in order to clarify the 
circumstances which form the background of the early part 
of the history of the gold standard in this country. 
3. THE INDEMNITY SPECIAL ACCOUNT 
The Indemnity Special Acount was the pivotal point of 
the financial problems which centered around the decision 
to adopt the gold standard after the termination of the 
Sino-Japanese War. "There is no other factor which exer· 
cised a greater influence on the history of the financial 
development of this country." 
All those who have some knowledge of the financial and 
banking affairs of Japan at that time will admit that the 
Indemnity Special Account had an inseparable relationship 
with the adoption of the gold standard. Moreover, the 
business of the Bank of Japan in connection with the pre· 
paration of the needed reserves-whether the mutual deposits 
of the Bank and the National Treasury, or the Government's 
interest· bearing deposits with the Bank - was carried on 
through this special account. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine this account which is by far the most important 
basic fact relating to the adoption of the gold standard by 
Japan. 
As all know, Japan was originally to receive from China 
-------_._-_._--- ._._---- _._- .. _- -----
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a war indemnity of 200 million taels and interest thereon 
as well as the sum of 1,500,000 taels to be spread out over 
three years. But later Japan was entitled to receive a further 
sum of 30 million taels as compensation for the return of 
Liaotung Peninsula, which had been ceded by China through 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. As has been already mentioned, 
all this was to be paid in the Kupei silver tael, Which, 
however, was only an appellation denoting weight and 
measure, and there was no actual coin corresponding to the 
term. The quality of the silver contained in the Kupei tael 
was not fixed and was not the same for all countries. Nor 
was there any regulation as to the grade of silver. It was 
clear that Japan could not afford to receive such a big sum 
of money as 230 million taels in such a dubious medium of 
exchange. The sum certainly was not a negligible amount can· 
sidering the economic condition of Japan at that time. It was 
clear that to evaluate this sum by a standard having neither 
fixed quality nor grade was highly impracticable. Further· 
more, it was said that China would float a loan in Europe 
in order to pay the indemnity. This would force China to 
buy silver and thereby affect the silver market of the world 
as well as the trade of the world including that of China and 
Japan. Consideration of all these factors led Japan to hesitate 
to receive the indemnity in Chinese currency. Japan at 
that time was passing through a period of industrial deve· 
lopment and armament expansion, and her imports from 
European countries were bound to assume stupendous pro· 
portions in the near future. Moreover, as has already been 
observed, the value of gold was tending to rise while that 
of silver was taking a down ward course throughout the 
whole world. All this made Japan exercise an extreme 
caution and arrange to receive the money in pounds sterling. 
On the other hand, there were some divergent views 
regarding this question. Some anticipated the development 
of Japan's industry under the silver standard and pointed 
to the futility of immediately adopting the gold standard. 
Others contented that the ideal system was the gold·silver 
._-_._-_._--_ ..... --.------.----.---.. ---~ 
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double standard. 
But we know today that Japan was given a most ex· 
cellent opportunity for adopting the gold standard. We all 
know how European nations struggled in order to obtain 
gold and to abandon silver. We also know what measures 
were resorted to by such colonial possessions as British India, 
the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Indo·China, etc., in 
preparation for the adoption of their respective gold standards. 
Again, we know what bitter experiences such countries as 
China and Siam have had in their attempt to cope with the 
same monetary problem. All these certainly go to show the 
great opportunity which was afforded Japan for the carrying 
out of her monetary reform. 
Japan was thus to receive an indemnity from China. 
But it was not to be paid at once, nor was the disburse· 
ment of the money to be made in a single fiscal year. 
Moreover, there was much difficulty in bringing the money 
from London. It was to be paid in pounds in London, so 
that it had to be converted into either bills of exchange or 
gold bullion for shipment to Japan. Now in transmitting 
such bills of exchange or gold bullion, consideration had to 
be given to the condition of the financial markets of the 
various Western countries and their movement was also 
dependent on the degree of Japan's demand for the money 
on each occasion. All this naturally gave rise to financial 
relations between the Government and the Bank of Japan. 
The above three circumstances are responsible for the 
establishment of the Indemnity Special Account by which 
the gold exchange standard was adopted by Japan. The 
third circumstance is explained in the following words: .. In 
importing the indemnity either in the form of a bill of 
exchange or gold bullion, the Government had to study the 
condition of the financial markets of European countries, so 
that no speedy shipment could be expected. On the other 
hand, there were frequent occasions when there was a 
pressing need for payment out of the revenue from the 
indemnity. On such occasions temporary accommodation 
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will be found imperative for the National Treasury. The 
following will be most convenient method under the circum· 
stance: The Government should deposit the indemnity either 
in pounds or in bullion with the Bank of Japan. the latter 
issuing paper money with the deposit as reserves for use 
by the Government." The above quotation throws a flood 
of light on the circumstances under which Japan adopted 
the gold standard. I shall go deeper into this matter. 
As everyone is aware. the difficulty of shifting from 
the silver standard or the gold·silver double standard to the 
single gold standard consists in the securing of gold reserves 
and in the disposition of silver currency. Inasmuch as the 
adoption of the gold standard drives out silver from the 
position of the standard currency. the amount of the fund 
for replacing the silver money by the gold or other moneys. 
together with the operation of the fund. has an important 
bearing on the adoption of the new monetary standard. It 
was in 1888 that Japan established her conversion system 
under which only silver was converted. and she had to secure 
gold reserves in order to adopt the gold standard. It was 
clear that had she failed to absorb a sufficient amount of 
gold reserves. the mere adoption of the gold standard would 
have caused much difficulty in the actual operation of the 
new system. 
This very difficulty was experienced by Japan at that 
time. Although she was in a position to receive in London 
pounds sterling equivalent to 372 million yen. she could not 
get as much as she needed for the enforcing of the gold 
standard. either because of conditions imposed by Great 
Britain or the circumstances of financial exchange. Under 
such adverse circumstances did Japan'adopt the gold standard. 
The returning of the troops was delayed because of the 
diplomatic interference of Russia. France and Germany in 
the terms of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty. and the Govern· 
ment needed a campaign fund for the Diet election of 1895. 
in which year it was expected that the indemnity would be 
received. In order to supply the Government with the 
•• ,"" <'. "" 
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needed funds, the Bank of Japan issued convertible bank 
notes beyond the legal limit in anticipation of the receipt of 
the indemnity after June, 1895. The following table shows 
convertible bank notes issued by the Bank of Japan beyond 
the legal limit: 
, 










Sept. , 156,897 
Oct. 158,692 
Nov. , 161,858 , 
Dec. 180,336 
Table I 















































Two methods were used for holding specie abroad by 
which the gold standard was operated: first, reciprocal 
depositing between the Government and the Bank of Japan 
and the depositing of funds bearing interest with the Bank 
of Japan. These methods are two forms of utilization of the 
Government's specie abroad in preparation for the new con· 
version system, and represent the holding by the Bank of 
Japan of the gold exchange reserves which are the basis 
for the operation of the gold exchange standard. Of these 
two, reciprocal depositing between the Government and the 
Bank of Japan is more important than the other when 
viewed from the standpoint of the gold standard. I shaH 
therefore explain how this reciprocal depositing is connected 
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4. RECIPROCAL DEPOSITING BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT AND THE BANK OF JAPAN 
Reciprocal depositing between the Government and the 
Bank of Japan was made either in pounds sterling or gold 
bullion. True, each of these had no direct connection with 
the functioning of the gold standard. According to the 
original plan, the pounds possessed by the Government in 
England (a small portion being held in Berlin) were to be 
deposited with the Bank of Japan to be used as reserves 
for issuing the Bank of Japan notes which were to be loaned 
to the Government. This plan was laid before the Cabinet 
which discussed the question of the monetary reform in 
1895. In this case the London branch of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank was to act as the agent of the Bank of Japan 
in holding the Government's indemnity fund in England. 
In November, 1895. the Government made the following 
decision, thereby showing reciprocal depositing between the 
Government and the Bank of Japan: 
"As far as possible, we intend to hold abroad (in 
pounds) the indemnity paid by China so that we may be in 
a position to purchase foreign goods for the expansion of 
the military and naval armaments and to buy railway and 
other materials" . . .. " We shall proceed to deposit the 
above·mentioned indemnity (in pounds) with the Bank of 
Japan to be used as reserves for issuing bank notes which 
are to be loaned to the National Treasury for making 
various domestic payments. The rate of interest on our 
deposits with the Bank shall be two per cent. per annum 
while that on our loans from the Bank shall be three per 
cent. per annum. 
The foregoing decision was reached by the Government 
in connection with the adjustment of the Special War Ex· 
penditure and Military and Naval Expansion Expenditure 
Account. 
We have the following written account showing how the indemnity 
deposited by the Government with the agent of the Bank of Japan in London 
was protected; 
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When the indemnity in pounds sterling was deposited with the agent 
according to Article 9 of the Trust Savings Procedure Act, the agent handed 
the receipt subscribing the pounds, the Japanese currency, the reserve amount, 
and the interest rate, etc., to the treasurer of the National Treasury. and 
was ordered to entrust the money to the Bank of England. When the 
receipt of the money and of the order was notified to the Government 
financial commissioner in London. he took out the money to be used as 
conversion reserves from the Bank of Japan agent to the Bank of England 
for ordinary deposit. Besides this ordinary method of depositing, there was 
a special method of depositing. According to some officials of the Bank of 
England, the special depositing consisted of depositing the pounds in a metal 
chest which was closed and sealed. The Bank of England was not concerned 
with the contents of the chest, and it only guaranteed the safekeeping of 
the chest as sealed. Thus, except in the case of bankruptcy, there was no 
concrete difference between the two methods, as far as the certainty of the 
security was concerned. The metal chest in which the money was placed 
had to be made up by the depositors, and the method of depositing and 
withdrawing was highly complicated. For these reasons, the Bank of Japan 
seemed to prefer the ordinary method of depositing. 
We shall next take up the second method of reciprocal 
depositing, namely, depositing of gold bullion which was 
brought to Japan from London. This was natural in view 
of the fact that the Government's order given to the Bank 
of Japan regarding reciprocal depositing specified both the 
pound and gold bullion as objects of deposit. This method 
was used by the Government probably because of its desire 
to immediately issue convertible notes by bringing to Japan 
specie held abroad. In other words, the Government most 
probably was dazzled by the name of the gold standard and 
feared that if gold bullion was re·coined into Japanese 
money, the Government might experience inconvenience in 
issuing currency during the period of coinage. It is needless 
to state that this of reciprocal depositing is a method that 
detaches itself from the principle of the gold standard. 
The maximum amount of deposits that the Government 
might make either in pounds or bullion with the Bank of 
Japan was fixed at 80 million yen. Deposits that could be 
made by the Government on May 20, 1896, amounted to 50 
million yen. In March, 1896, the Law No. 10 was pro· 
mulgated whereby the Special War Expenditure Account 
----------------- ---_ ... __ ._ ... _ ... 
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was terminated in the same month, and a sum of 78,950,000 
yen out of the indemnity fund was to be used for the 
special war expenditure through the 1895 additional budget. 
But the amount of the indemnity fund in Japan at that 
time was only 9,020,000 yen. Thus, there was a deficit of 
69,030,000 yen even if the entire sum was to be used for 
the special war expenditure. Moreover, there was no pros· 
pect of bringing such a vast sum of money from England 
within that fiscal year. Thus, the Government resorted to 
the method of reciprocal depositing and borrowed a sum of 
50 million yen to be used for the special war expenditure. 
As Table II indicates, the issuing of the Bank of Japan 
notes beyond the legal limit continued from June, 1895, 
to May, 1896. In June, 1896, the notes were converted 
into specie abroad and the amount of specie reserves rose 
rapidly, reaching 77 million yen in March and December, 
1896. 
Table II 
The Amount of the Bank of Japan Notes Issued Beyond 
the Legal Limit Sinee 1895-6 at Month.End (in yen): 
! 
Months Amount I Months Amount 





June 13.811.495 Aug. 
! 
14,197,333 
July 13,070,623 Sept. , 22,771,032 
Aug. 20,343,260 Oct. 29,199.623 
Sept. 20,767,605 Nov. 32,142,248 
Oct. 
, 
72,512,650 Dec. 47,312,657 
Nov. 33,071,300 1898 : Jan. 39,529,488 
Dec. 55,083,147 Feb. 30,626,515 
1896 : Jan. 50,937,635 March 39,658,322 
Feb. 44,434,258 April 37,690,179 
March 36,409,047 May 28,690,601 
April ! 33,786,955 June 
, 
33,446,481 , 
May 26,98?694 July 19,874,548 
Aug. 14,661,165 
1897 : July 24 455,306 Sept. 1,111,069 
.. ---.------.~- -~~- .. _._----
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Table III 
Showing the Increase of the Convertible Notes Issued 
from March. 1895, to June, 1897 (in yen). 
Year and Month Specie Reserves Security Reserves Bank Notes 
1895 : March 72,367,888 62,856,766 135,344,654 
June 64,885,149 78,198,514 143,083,663 
Sept. 68,250,119 85,647,664 153,987,783 
Dec. 60,370,797 119,966,018 180,336,815 
1896 : March 55,347,000 101,794,817 157,141.819 
June 107,181,079 64,513,800 171,694,879 
Sept. 110,876,054 66,229,305 176,605,359 
Dec. 132,730,192 65,583,704 198,313,896 
1897 : March 109,488,027 71,624,253 
I 
181,112,280 
June 119,437,064 75,865,605 I 195,302 ,669 
As to the interest rate on reciprocal deposits, that of 
the Government's deposit was one per cent. per annum and 
that of its loans two per cent., so that the National Treasury 
shouldered the burden of one per cent. per annum for the 
entire transaction. Thus, the sooner the system ended the 
better it was for the National Treasury. After the arrival 
of gold bullion from London towards the close of 1896, the 
reciprocal depositing of the indemnity fund in pounds ster-
ling was replaced by that of gold bullion without any interest 
thereon. Now, the difference of one per cent. in the interest 
rates of reciprocal depositing was intended to enable the 
Bank of Japan to meet the cost of printing and issuing 
notes. After it was discovered that the difference of the 
rates in amount since May, 1896, had far surpassed all the 
cost of printing and issuing the Bank of Japan notes for 
that particular purpose, interest was abandoned in reciprocal 
depositing after January I, 1897. 
The system of reciprocal depositing in pounds primarily 
originated in the realization that the bringing of the indem-
nity fund to Japan within a short period of time would be 
very difficult. This point was greatly stressed by the 
-.---... -._- --------. -----' 
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Government delegates at the Imperial Diet. Mr. Matsuo, 
one of the delegates, told the Diet that the indemnity fund 
would be brought to the country both in silver coins and 
in bills of exchange and that it was impossible to bring the 
fund into Japan by means of bills of exchange alone in 
amounts of more than 10 million yen a year. Mr. Tajiri, 
another government delegate, explained the system of reci· 
procal depositing substantially as follows: 
"The plan is somewhat complicated. It is impossible 
to transfer the entire sum of 80 million yen in gold coins. 
But if the fund is converted into silver, the price of silver 
will immediately rise. The Government will also suffer an 
economic detriment if the money is brought here in pounds, 
because the amount of pounds will be very large. Supposing 
we bring the fund here in silver, we must proceed very gradu· 
ally so as not to effect the exchange quotations. If a bank 
should buy, say, 100,000 pounds' worth of silver in London, 
the price of silver will soar. If 50,000 dollars' worth of 
silve.r is purchased, say, in San Francisco, the silver market 
there will receive a staggering blow. The New York market 
will be similarly affected if 100,000 dollars' worth of silver 
is bought there. If a big amount of gold is shipped in 
silver bills of exchange, it will be very expensive and will 
be more costly than to pay interest thereon. The proposed 
Indemnity Special Account Act provides for reciprocal de· 
positing between the Government and the Bank of Japan, 
in which a difference of one per cent. in rate will be allowed 
the Bank. The Bank of Japan will be required to pay two 
per cent. interest on the Goverment's deposits with it, while 
the Government will pay interest on the convertible notes 
borrowed from the Bank. The Government will deposit 
the gold it secures in the vaults of the Bank of Japan to 
be used as reserves for newly issued convertible notes. 
This rather complicated system was contrived because of 
the fear that, if we were to bring in 80 million yen within 
one year, the price of silver would go up, resulting in a 
loss to the Government. The Bank of Japan pays two per 
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cent. interest to the Government, which, in turn, gives a 
fee of one per cent. to the Bank. This scheme, we hope, 
will enable us to use the indemnity fund without causing a 
rise in the exchange quotations and without affecting the 
economic circles of our country". 
There were some adverse views regarding the Govern· 
ment's plan, especially in connection with its treating the 
indemnity fund in London as part of the specie reserves 
for the currency. There were the following three main 
types of argument against the plan of the Government. 
First, since it will take several months for specie abroad to 
arrive in the country, the issuing of convertible notes as 
described above is a form of security reserve rather than 
specie reserve. Secondly, the specie to be used as reserves 
by the Central Bank should be that located within the 
country, and although there is no legal provision regarding 
the location of specie reserves, reason dictates that they 
should be at hand within the country instead of being 
located in a distant land. Thirdly, it is not a violation of 
the convertible bank note regulations to issue bank notes 
beyond the legal limit by using specie abroad as security 
reserves, in order to bring specie abroad graduallY into the 
country; but to treat specie abroad as conversion reserves 
would be a violation of the convertible bank note regulations. 
Viewed from the standpoint of domestic currency, such views 
as these may not be able to find an absolute certainty in 
the Government's conversion measure; viewed from the 
standpoint of international credit currency, the measure in 
question may be regarded as a progressive method. 
Other critics of the Government's policy pointed to the 
fact that specie abroad was deposited without any interest, 
and stated that it would be more profitable if the money 
was brought here for business investment. It should be 
noted, however, that the entire amount of specie abroad 
was not deposited without any interest, but some part of it 
yielded interest so that the criticism was not well founded. 
But the gold exchange standard at that time was not 
r , 
, 
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positively utilized, and it was merely regarded as something 
indispensable for the time being and many believed that it 
would not be a good economic policy to retain it for a long 
period of time. But as has been already noted, the policy 
of issuing currency notes against specie held abroad was 
substituted for the policy of issuing currency notes beyond 
the legal limit, and the latter policy is an indication of 
abnormal conditions in the financial world or of an excessive 
demand for capital. Naturally, it was thought that, if gold 
exchange reserves are provided for the issuance of con· 
vertible notes beyond the legal limit, there wiI! be no way 
of knowing the degree of monetary demand. Thus, the 
Bank of Japan gradually began to return the Government's 
deposits, beginning from the spring of 1897, in exchange for 
the convertible notes issued as security reserves. By May 
10, 1897, the Bank of Japan turned one half of the Govern· 
ment's reciprocal deposits in pounds into a reciprocal deposit 
of gold bullion and settled the entire amount by returning 
it in silver bullion and bills of exchange. Thus, the account 
of reciprocal deposits in pounds was settled. This reflects 
the low credit power possessed by Japan at that time among 
the nations of the world. 
5. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST·BEARING 
DEPOSITS WITH THE BANK OF JAPAN 
Besides the reciprocal deposit system above noted, the 
Government also resorted to another method by way of 
operating the gold exchange standard by means of specie 
held abroad. Whenever the supply of capital was insufficient 
to meet the demand, the Government made interest·bearing 
deposits with the Bank of Japan out of the specie held 
abroad, the Bank issuing convertible notes on the specie 
thus deposited. On the other hand, it should be noted a 
considerable proportion of such deposits was concerned with 
exchange capital rather than with market capital only. 
The Government's policy of making deposits with the 
~------
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Bank of Japan for financial reasons originated towards the 
close of 1896, when the Bank asked for a loan of 10 million 
yen redeemable by January 10, 1897, because of the stringency 
in the monetary market. But the National Treasury was 
not in a position to make such advances and the Govern· 
ment relieved the financial distress by making a deposit 
bearing three per cent. interest for the fixed period between 
December 28, 1896, and January 10, 1897. In other words, 
the Government made this deposit out of the specie holdings 
in pounds sterling to be used as reserves against the issuance 
of notes, which were then loaned out as market capital. 
This transaction was also a form of gold exchange standard 
operation. This particular deposit with the Bank of Japan 
was settled at the specified time, namely, January 10, 1897. 
The chief difference between this deposit and the previous 
ones lies in the fact that the former was loaned to civilians 
and the latter to the Government. 
Again, the Government used its specie abroad for reliev· 
ing the economic panic of 1898 by depositing it at interest 
with the Bank of Japan. At that time the financial circles 
were faced by an extreme monetary stringency, and it was 
impossible to sell the pre·arranged government bonds in the 
usual markets, because of the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives and other circumstances. The Government 
accordingly secured the consent of the Diet to make a 
temporary use of part of the indemnity fund for meeting 
the expenditure in connection with government loans and 
to carry out the general financial plans. The amount dis· 
bursed for this purpose up to December, 1899, was estimated 
at 42 million yen. This sum was later redeemed in both 
local currency and pounds out of the government loans in 
pounds at four per cent. interest. Out of £ 2,500,000, 
£ 2,100,000 was deposited with the Bank of Japan by noti· 
fication, while the remainder was entrusted to the Bank of 
England. 
Thus, the Bank of Japan received a sum of £ 2,100,000 
out of the Government's deposits and entrusted it to the 
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Bank of England in a separate account to be used as reserves 
against the issuance of convertible notes. Thus, the money 
was earmarked as conversion reserves. This money was 
the same in nature as the reciprocal deposits we have 
already noted, in so far as it functioned as a condition for 
the operation of the gold exchange standard. 
This system of deposits bearing interest was utilized 
for securing exchange capital or funds through the Bank of 
Japan in addition to maintaining the gold exchange standard, 
but I shaU not enter into detail regarding this point. AU 
these deposits were used for supplying capital to private 
individuals and corporations. These deposits did not result 
directly in the issuance of convertible notes to be sure; 
but the transfer of the indemnity fund by means of these 
deposits played an important role in the issuance of convertible 
notes. What an important part the Bank of Japan played 
in accommodating the Government with loans at that time 
is difficult to realize at present, inasmuch as the Bank has 
ceased to be important as a central bank and has become 
the leading private bank. But in the middle of the Meiji 
Era, the Bank of Japan functioned more as a government 
bank than as a private financial institution, and it was but 
natural that its advances to the Government should have 
played a stupendous part in the issuing of convertible notes 
for the operation of the gold exchange standard. 
6. CONCLUSION 
I have shown how Japan adopted the gold exchange 
standard, which is a form of the gold standard, by utilizing 
the indemnity fund secured from China at the close of the 
war with that country. I have explained the manner in 
which fund was used. By far the most important factor in 
the origin of the gold exchange standard, as adopted by this 
country, is the circumstance that the reserves against the 
issuance of notes were provided by the indemnity fund in 
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to the gold standard. 
Part of the indemnity fund which the Government 
received from China in London in pounds sterling through 
the London branch of tbe Yokohama Specie Bank, which 
acted as its agent, was utilized either in the form of reci· 
procal deposits between the Government and the Bank of 
Japan or as ordinary deposits with the same bank. In the 
reciprocal deposit system, the Government deposited part of 
the specie in pounds with the Bank of Japan to be ear· 
marked as reserves against issuance of convertible notes, 
which, in turn were loaned to the Government by the Bank. 
On the other hand, in the case of the ordinary deposit 
sYstem, the Government deposited a definite amount of specie 
in pounds in London with the Bank of Japan at a definite 
rate of interest and for a fixed period of time; and the 
same deposit was turned over to the Ban k of England by 
the Bank of Japan, also to be earmarked as reserves against 
the issuance of convertible notes in Japan. These notes 
were also advanced by the Bank of Japan to the Govern· 
ment. All these deposits either in reciprocal or in ordinary 
form were redeemed on the expiry of their respective periods, 
and the Bank of Japan used the Government's specie abroad 
in pounds according to the form of the gold exchange 
standard and made them note reserves. Thus, we can say 
that the Chinese indemnity played a conspicuous part in the 
establishment of the gold standard in this country. Nor 
can we ignore the fact that besides functioning as a means 
of establishing the gold exchange standard, the indemity 
fund served also as gold reserve for the conversion of one 
yen silver coins. 
The use of specie abroad for the adoption of the gold 
exchange standard resulted, on the one hand, in the expansion 
of the currency and incidentally in a post bellum panic. 
On the other hand, it was instrumental in bringing about the 
subsidence of the same financial panic. Thus, it created a 
national problem and then solved it all at once, so that its 
demerit has been evened up by its merit. The fact remains, 
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however, that it created an economic issue by placing 
Japanese economy in an unstable condition for several years 
prior to and following the adoption of the gold exchange 
standard. 
Lastly, I wish to dwell on a principle which is supposed 
to condition the adoption and operation of the gold standard. 
It is asserted that a nation can adopt the gold standard 
only when its international accounts are in its favour or at 
least are balanced. This principle, however, was conspicuous 
by its absence in the case of Japan, whose international 
accounts were not balanced and whose adoption of the gold 
standard was due solely to the sagacious use she made of 
the war indemnity. Japan was also subject to the effects 
of the depreciation of silver which was a universal pheno· 
menon at that time, and was in pursuit of a better interest 
rate, so that she was not free from the usual conditions on 
her adoption of the gold standard. The fact is that being 
still in the infant stage of industrial development, Japan's 
overseas trade had remained unfavourable. Her use of the 
indemnity fund for the adoption of the gold standard was 
an exceptional event among the nations of the Orient. 
In this connection there is a fact worth consideration. 
Japan at that time came to control the economies of both 
Chosen and Taiwan. Now, the gold standard was extended 
to the former in a short space of time, but not to the latter. 
As soon as the power of Japanese economy penetrated 
Chosen, the gold standard came to be applied there, but 
this was not the case with Taiwan. The monetary systems 
of both Chosen and Taiwan were in a deplorable condition 
at the time Japanese influence found its way into these 
regions, but the two countries were different as regards 
their trade relations with Japan. Japanese banks had been 
operating in Chosen prior to the adoption of the gold standard, 
and Japanese currency had been used for the payment 
of customs duties in the peninsula. Thus, the soil had been 
well prepared in Chosen for the extension of the gold 
standard there. On the other hand, there were no such 
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preparatory circumstances in Taiwan, whose monetary 
system was the same as that of its original home country. 
There are two distinct policies in Japan's overseas 
economy: the northern policy, which has been found sue· 
cessful and the southern policy which has been rather slow 
in making any advance. This is a serious problem from 
the standpoint of our national economy. I am convinced 
that this difference is due to the fact that whereas the gold 
standard is operated in Chosen through the Bank of Chosen, 
it is not operated in Taiwan by the Bank of Taiwan. The 
Bank of Japan began its activities in the southern territories 
of the Empire quite a long time ago, but its efforts have 
not yet been rewarded with success. This fact may be 
responsible for the failure of the operation of the gold 
standard in Taiwan. 
It was fortunate for Japan that she was able to adopt 
the gold standard with the aid of a war indemnity and then 
made a rapid and persistent development in her economic 
life. As she could use the indemnity, she had no need of 
importing foreign capital for the purpose of adopting the 
gold standard, and thus Japanese capitalism happily escaped 
the financial control of a creditor nation. This fact is by 
far the most important feature of Japanese economy during 
the period between the close of the 19th and the early years 
of the 20th century - a fact no student of Japanese economy 
can afford to ignore. 
Source of Tables;- The History of Japanese Finance during the Meiji 
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